10 July 2008
Investigation into complaint no 07/A/12661 against the London Borough of Camden
Key to names used
Mrs Gordon The complainant
Ms Shepard The complainant’s sister
Ms Bean A Community Mental Healthcare Trust Manager
Report summary
Subject
Mrs  Gordon had mental health difficulties and was not capable of managing  her own affairs. Camden Council’s Community Mental Health Team was aware  of this. Mrs Gordon had not paid her council tax. The Council’s Revenue  team applied for a bankruptcy order, which was granted. They did not  adequately record what checks they made and did not make any checks with  the social care side of the Council, which would have shown that  bankruptcy was not an appropriate recovery method in this case. The  consequence was that the resolution of a separate legal case concerning  Mrs Gordon’s financial affairs was delayed, and substantial unnecessary  costs, payable by Mrs Gordon, were incurred by a court appointed  Litigation Friend and the Trustee in Bankruptcy.
Finding
Maladministration causing injustice, remedy agreed.
Recommended remedy
The  Council has agreed to apply to the court to annul the bankruptcy. If  the bankruptcy is annulled the Ombudsman recommends the Council contacts  credit rating agencies to advise them that Mrs Gordon’s bankruptcy has  been annulled. The Ombudsman recommends the Council changes its  procedures to make stringent checks for potential vulnerability before  taking action leading to bankruptcy, a charging order or committal.
Introduction
1.  Ms Shepard complains on behalf of her sister, Mrs Gordon, about the  actions of the London Borough of Camden in making her bankrupt for  non-payment of council tax on 12 May 2005. Ms Shepard says that Mrs  Gordon should not have been made bankrupt as she was mentally ill and  unable to manage her own affairs, and the Council was aware of this.
2. The Council says that it had no contact from Mrs Gordon about her council tax until after it had made her bankrupt.
3.  During the course of this investigation one of my investigators has met  with and interviewed Ms Shepard. He has also inspected the Council’s  files and computerised records concerning its dealings with Mrs Gordon.  My investigator also interviewed officers of the Council who have been  involved in the matters complained about, including the Local Taxation  Recovery Manager and Ms Bean, a Manager in the Camden and Islington  Community Mental Healthcare Trust, which is an NHS and Council  partnership.
4. Ms Shepard, the Council, the Litigation Friend  and the Trustee in Bankruptcy have all seen a draft of this report. My  investigator has also discussed the report with Council officers. All  comments have been taken into account in this final report.
5. For legal reasons1 the names of those mentioned in this report are not their real names.
Legal and Administrative Background
My Jurisdiction
6.  There are a number of sections of the Local Government Act 1974, which  defines my powers, which have to be considered in reaching a decision on  Mrs Gordon’s complaint.
7. First, the Act says that I cannot  conduct any investigation into “the commencement or conduct of civil or  criminal proceedings in any court of law”.2  However, I retain jurisdiction to investigate administrative actions  prior to the issue of court proceedings and, where the Council instructs  agents for enforcement of court orders, the actions of those agents  (unless they are agents of the Court).
8. Second, the Act also  says that, usually, I should not investigate a complaint where the  complainant has had the right to pursue their complaint via the  alternative remedy of a statutory tribunal or the Courts.3 However,  this is at my discretion and I can investigate where I am satisfied  that it was not reasonable to expect the complainant to use those  rights. I have no jurisdiction to consider a complaint if proceedings  have been issued in respect of an alternative right or remedy.4  However, I retain jurisdiction to investigate if Court proceedings have  been sought that are misconceived; i.e. where there is no legal basis  for the action being sought.
9. Third, the Act also says that  normally I should not investigate a complaint unless it was made to me,  or to an elected councillor, within 12 months from the day when the  complainant first knew something had happened that affected him or her.5  However, this is again a discretionary bar and I can investigate where I  am satisfied that there are special reasons to accept a complaint about  matters the complainant has been aware of for a longer period.
10.  Ms Shepard only became aware of Mrs Gordon’s bankruptcy in 2007. I am  clear that Mrs Gordon has mental health difficulties which impair her  ability to act in her own interests, and that it is reasonable for Ms  Shepard to act on her behalf. I have exercised my discretion over the  right to apply to court for an annulment because of the practical  difficulties in getting Mrs Gordon to engage as part of the evidence  gathering process and the prohibitive cost of legal representation.
Council powers to collect unpaid council tax
11.  Where a sum of council tax is unpaid, the Council can seek an order  from the Magistrates Court, known as a liability order, in order to  pursue recovery of the outstanding amount. Once the Council has obtained  a liability order against a debtor it has a number of options available  to try to secure payment of its debt. The Courts have held that while  recovery action for a council tax debt can be coercive, it is not  unlawful if it becomes punitive because of the debtor’s failure to pay.6 The powers a Council has to recover unpaid council tax are detailed in the appendix to this report.
12. The Council has a council tax recovery policy, which was approved by members in 2005. This says - 
∞ “Charging Order  Where a taxpayer owns a property and we have been unsuccessful at  obtaining payment in any other way, then we will consider taking an  action to obtain an order forcing the sale of the property to cover the  debt and the costs of the action. This is a last ditch attempt to  collect and the procedure is protracted, but in some cases this is the  only available action left open to us.
∞ Bankruptcy We will  make a petition for the bankruptcy of some taxpayers. Again this is a  protracted, expensive and time consuming exercise, however we have found  it to be successful and in some circumstances this is the only  appropriate action we can take to secure payment. The costs of this type  of action can be claimed from the debtor.
∞ Committal If  payment is not received then we may decide that the appropriate way  forward is to take the case back to Court and ask for an investigation  to be made into the debtor’s means. This action is only used in cases  where bankruptcy or charging orders are not appropriate, and in cases  where the bailiff has attempted to collect the debt but has been  unsuccessful .…”
Data Protection
13.  This complaint involves failure to share data held by different parts  of the Council so I need to consider if the restrictions in the use of  personal data under the Data Protection Act 1998 prevented this data  being shared. Section 2 of the Act says that information about a  person’s physical or mental health is sensitive personal data. 
Schedule  3 of the Act gives conditions for processing such data and is given in  appendix 2 of this report. Paragraph 3 of the schedule says that such  data can be processed to protect the vital interests of the data subject  in a case where consent by or on behalf of the data subject has been  unreasonably withheld.
14. Camden Council takes the view that  personal information will be used only for the purposes for which it was  collected. Other London authorities take the view that consent is only  needed if the information is to be used for a purpose that is not part  of a service the Council has to provide by law and any Council  department can use information, even if it was collected for another  purpose.7
15. The Information Commissioner has said8  that he will avoid an overly restrictive application of the law where  that would lead to organisations failing to make sensible use of the  information they hold. Guidance issued by the Information Commissioner9  says that information held by different authority departments can be  shared as long as it not for a completely separate and unrelated  purpose, and data protection principles are applied. The Guidance says  that local authorities should be open and transparent about all the  probable reasons for which such data may be used.
1 Local Government Act 1974 (“the 1974 Act”), section 30(3).
2 Local Government Act 1974, Schedule 5
3 Local Government Act 1974, Section 26 (6) (a) and 26 (6) (c)
4  Local Government Act 1974, Section 26(6),, R v Commissioner for Local  Administration, ex parte PH (1999) EWCA Civ 916, R v Commissioner for  Local Administration, ex parte Field (2000) COD 58 and Roao Scholarstica  Umo) v Commissioner for Local Administration in England (2003) EWHC  3202 (Admin)
5 Local Government Act 1974, Section 26(4)
6 R v Cannock Justices ex parte Ireland (1995)
7  Information from the Council websites for the London Boroughs of  Camden, Merton, and Islington and the City of Westminster; accessed  April 2008.
8 “Sharing Personal Information – Our Approach”; Information Commissioners Office, April 2007
9 “Data Protection Good Practice Note – Sharing data between different local authorities” June 2008
Investigation
Mrs Gordon’s contacts with the Community Mental Healthcare Trust
16.  Mrs Gordon suffers from a continuing mental illness. In 2000 she was  forcibly admitted for treatment to hospital under the Mental Health Act  1983 at the initiative of the Camden and Islington Community Mental  Healthcare Trust (CMHT) and Ms Bean10  was involved in this admission. After a stay in hospital Mrs Gordon  discharged herself, returned home and refused further offers of help  from the CMHT.
17. At the beginning of 2002 the CMHT on its own  initiative assessed Mrs Gordon, since her family informed them in that  they did not feel qualified to make a decision about Mrs Gordon's  sectioning. CMHT decided that she should not be detained in hospital as  she was not a risk to herself or others, although they acknowledged that  she was suffering from paranoid psychosis. Mrs Gordon again declined  offers of help.
18. At this time Mrs Gordon was involved in  litigation with a bank over a mortgage. In the course of this it became  apparent to the Court that Mrs Gordon was not capable of representing  herself or conducting her own affairs. The Court asked that a Litigation  Friend11 be appointed. The bank  approached Ms Bean at the CMHT. She helped provide medical evidence of  Mrs Gordon’s illness and in July 2003 the Court appointed the Official  Solicitor as her Litigation Friend.
19. In December 2004 Ms  Shepard wrote to the Council's social services unit in view of a  possible imminent settlement of Mrs Gordon's financial affairs after the  appointment of the Litigation Friend, and general concerns about Mrs  Gordon's mental health and financial welfare. Ms Shepard sought  coordinated action by Council services. She expressed concern that Mrs  Gordon was neither working nor claiming social security benefits and  wondered how she paid for her gas, other utilities and council tax. Ms  Shepard asked if the Council could help with claiming benefit for Mrs  Gordon. She also mentioned the appointment of the Litigation Friend and  the possibility that Mrs Gordon would need rehousing if her home was  repossessed as a result of the legal proceedings.
20. The letter  was acknowledged by the social services complaints team and passed to  the CMHT. Ms Bean had two telephone conversations with Ms Shepard and  then wrote to her to in January 2005 to confirm that the CMHT were aware  of the appointment of the Official Solicitor, but that Mrs Gordon had  always declined support from the CMHT.
21. In August 2005 Ms  Shepard again contacted the CMHT about her sister and her concern over  the lack of any state benefits. The CMHT wrote to Mrs Gordon, who  replied to say that she was 
“…  quite satisfied with the professional advice she received from her  solicitors and accountants/financial advisors who act for me as and when  I require.” At this point, Ms Shepard, Ms Bean and the Official  Solicitor did not know that on 12 May 2005 Mrs Gordon had been made  bankrupt by the Council for nonpayment of her council tax.
Council tax recovery action
22.  Mrs Gordon had not been paying her council tax. The Council had  obtained liability orders and instructed bailiffs to collect the debt.  Some payments were made, and there was some contact with Mrs Gordon, but  nothing in these contacts suggested she had any mental health  difficulties. She had been claiming council tax benefit, but her claim  had lapsed in January 2001. Bailiffs were instructed, but were unable to  collect the debts, including for the period in which she was sectioned  under the Mental Health Act and the years subsequent to this.
23.  By November 2004 Mrs Gordon owed £5,109.48 council tax and court costs  for the period from 1996 to 2005. The council tax recovery section  checked that she owned her own property and passed the debt to  solicitors for bankruptcy proceedings. The Council's records do not show  that checks about her circumstances were made with the council tax  benefit section or with adult care services. When interviewed the  council tax Recovery Manager says that the council tax team do not have  full access to the benefits system so cannot look at claim forms, and  they did not check such cases with adult care services (although this is  to change). There is no record of why the Council considered bankruptcy  (as opposed to committal or a Charging Order) was appropriate.
24.  In its response to the draft of this report the Council say that it has  spoken to the manager who made the decision in this case, who later  moved to another position in the Council. He said that he made  appropriate checks of council tax and benefit records, checked  correspondence and bailiff reports, and then properly considered if  other recovery methods were appropriate, in accordance with the  Council's policy. The policy did not require the physical recording of  these checks, but that is not to say they were not carried out.
25. The Council also questions if it was –
"...  reasonable for the recovery manager to display what would have been an  extraordinary level of foresight and conduct an unsolicited check with  Social Services - with nothing to point him in that direction?"
26.  The Council's solicitors wrote to Mrs Gordon to warn her that the  Council intended to take bankruptcy proceedings against her. The letter  did not give any warning of the costs that would be incurred or the risk  of losing her home. Mrs Gordon did not contact the Council or the  solicitors.
27. The statutory demand was served, and on 12 May  2005 Mrs Gordon was made bankrupt. The Official Receiver appointed a  Trustee in Bankruptcy to deal with the matter.
After the bankruptcy
28.  The legal action between the bank and Mrs Gordon had almost reached a  conclusion, with an agreement to sell the property to meet the debt and  use the balance to buy a new home for Mrs Gordon. The bankruptcy meant  that this resolution was no longer possible as the Trustees in  Bankruptcy now controlled the disposal of the property.
29. In  August 2006, once the bank and the Litigation Friend became aware of the  bankruptcy, the council tax section was contacted by the Litigation  Friend. At this point the council tax section became aware that Mrs  Gordon had mental health difficulties and that the CMHT had been aware  of this. A Recovery Officer emailed Ms Bean to find out what was known,  saying –
“Had this department been aware of her circumstances [mental  impairment] then this action [bankruptcy] would never have been taken  and more appropriately a charge would have been made on her property.”
30.  Ms Bean replied to say that Mrs Gordon had not engaged with her team,  but Ms Bean had been someone the family could approach if they felt the  need. She also said that a Litigation Friend had been appointed by the  court.
31. The Litigation Friend then asked the Council if it  would annul the bankruptcy. The Council contacted the Trustee and said  it would annul the bankruptcy if both parties bore their own costs. At  this stage the Trustee in Bankruptcy’s costs were around £8,150. The  Trustee responded by saying that case law12  said that in cases where the petitioning creditor realises an error has  been made they should pay the Trustee's costs and remuneration as the  Trustee is an innocent party, appointed as a result of the petitioning  creditor's actions. The Council refused to proceed on this basis.
32.  At the end of November 2007 Ms Shepard learnt about the bankruptcy and  wrote to the Council to complain about this action being taken, in view  of the Council's knowledge of Mrs Gordon's mental health. The Council’s  response was that, on the basis of the information the Council had, the  decision to make Mrs Gordon bankrupt was justified.
However, when  my investigator interviewed Ms Bean she said that if a Recovery Officer  had asked her about Mrs Gordon she would have told them she was  incapable of managing her own affairs.
33. As a result of my  investigation the Council has now applied to have the bankruptcy  annulled. It will be up to the court to decide who should pay the costs  of all parties involved. The Trustee’s costs are now about £42,800 and  Litigation Friend’s costs are around £7,600. Many of these costs have  been incurred as a result of the delay to the resolution of the legal  case with the bank and the additional work required by the Trustee to  secure the creditor's position. As both the Litigation Friend and the  Trustee in Bankruptcy have been appointed by the courts I cannot, for  the reason given in paragraph 7, comment either favourably or  unfavourably on their actions or the level of their costs.
Conclusion
34.  In its response to the draft report the Council suggested that the CMHT  should have passed Ms Shepard's letter of December 2004 asking for  assistance on to council tax. I have considered this point, but am  reluctant to conclude this was maladministration. The letter asked for a  range of help, not just for assistance with council tax. The CMHT’s  response was to contact Mrs Gordon, who refused assistance. A council  cannot force somebody to make a claim for council tax benefit, or make  it for them if they do not cooperate. However, it would have been open  to Ms Shepard to contact the revenue team directly and explain her  sister’s situation.
35. Recovery of council tax from debtors is  becoming an increasingly difficult business. Bailiffs are less effective  and committals appear to use considerable resources for a low recovery  rate. So councils have been increasingly turning to bankruptcy as a  recovery method. As my colleague Ombudsman has already said13  bankruptcy is a legitimate method of recovery and is appropriate in  some cases. My investigator has been told by several authorities that  they find that the threat of bankruptcy often produces payment in full  or suitable arrangements to pay. The authorities say that few cases  proceed beyond the threat of bankruptcy, and even fewer to a forced  sale.
36. So use of bankruptcy or its threat may be a legitimate  way of collecting a local taxation debt. But the consequences can be  traumatic, possibly involving considerable costs payable by the debtor  and at worse the forced sale of their home. In view of this, councils  need to consider alternative recovery methods to bankruptcy and have  evidence of why they were not pursued. Camden Council says that checks  were carried out, but not recorded. I cannot say if the checks were or  were not carried out, but the Council did not have satisfactory  mechanisms in place to record why the decision to pursue bankruptcy was  made or any supporting evidence for this decision. This was  maladministration.
37. Part of the Council was aware that Mrs  Gordon had a mental health difficulty and was unable to conduct her own  affairs. The failure to make effective internal enquiries led to  unwarranted action against a clearly vulnerable lady. This was also  maladministration.
38. If a council chooses to use bankruptcy to  collect a local taxation debt it should make all reasonable checks of  the information it has to establish that the debtor is not vulnerable.  Given the possible consequences of bankruptcy I do not think it  unreasonable for Revenue Officers to look beyond their own departmental  information and consider a council's records as a whole. If required  enquiries of Adult Social care should establish, via the professional  opinion of a social worker, if that the debtor is vulnerable. In  addition reasonable steps should be taken to contact the debtor  personally to see if there are any grounds for not proceeding with the  action.
39. If information had been sought and made available,  the Council most likely would have applied for a Charging Order instead.  This would have not have prevented the sale of Mrs Gordon’s property to  meet her debts to the bank, and would probably have cleared the debt to  the Council at a lower cost.
40. It is also worth commenting on  the Council's response to Ms Shepard's complaint. Despite clear evidence  officers were aware that, in retrospect, the bankruptcy action had not  been appropriate, the Council's response to the complaint was that the  action was justified. The Council's response was inappropriate and  unhelpful to the concerned relatives of Mrs Gordon.
41. The  result of this has been to cause Mrs Gordon an injustice in that the  resolution of her case with the bank has been delayed and substantial  additional costs have been added that will be paid for out of the sale  of her property.
Finding
42. For the reasons  set out in paragraph 36 and 37 I find maladministration by the Council  causing the injustice described in paragraph 41.
Proposal for settlement
43.  I must now seek to put Mrs Gordon in the position that she would have  been had no maladministration occurred. My draft report recommended that  the Council should apply to the court for the annulment of Mrs Gordon’s  bankruptcy, on the grounds she was not capable of managing her own  affairs at the time and pay the costs of this action. I am pleased to  say that the Council has applied for an annulment.
44.  Bankruptcy has a detrimental effect on an individual's credit rating.  If the court annuls the bankruptcy I recommend the Council contact  credit rating agencies to make them aware of this. Normally this would  be the responsibility of the debtor, but Mrs Gordon seems incapable of  taking such action or of giving authorization for Ms Shepard to do this.
45.  This leaves the question of Mrs Gordon’s liability for her council tax  debt. It is possible she is entitled to an exemption on the grounds of  her mental health. The Litigation Friend has applied for such an  exemption and the Council is considering this. If it is able to award an  exemption I would recommend this be backdated as far as possible. The  Council then can consider whether, in the light of the action being  taken by the bank, it should apply for a Charging Order or obtain some  other binding agreement that any remaining council tax debt and  liability order costs be paid.
46. I recommend the Council  reviews its procedure to ensure that stringent checks of all its records  are carried out, and recorded, for any potential vulnerability before  taking action against a debtor leading to bankruptcy, a charging order  or committal. I would ask the Council to report to me within three  months to let me know what changes it has made.
47. The Council  may wish to review its policy on the sharing of personal data within the  Council in the light of the practice of other councils and the advice  of the Information Commissioner.
10 Ms Bean is technically an employee of Camden Council
11 An independent person who will manage the case to ensure that the litigant’s interests are represented
12 Butterworth –v- Souter [2000] BPIR 582
13 Report 06/B/16600 against Wolverhampton, issued 31 March 2008
Tony Redmond 10 July 2008
Local Government Ombudsman
Millbank Tower, Millbank
LONDON SW1P 4QP
Appendix 1 – Council tax recovery procedure
1. Options for recovery of debts of council tax are described below.
Bailiffs
2.  Bailiffs can be instructed to collect outstanding debts, if necessary  through threatening to take, or actually taking certain goods owned by  the debtor. A bailiff cannot take such a levy unless they have gained  peaceful entry into a debtor’s home or premises, or can levy on goods  outside the property such as a car. Unless peaceful entry has been made  on a previous visit bailiffs do not have the right to break in to  collect council tax debts.
Attachment of earnings
3.  If a debtor is in PAYE employment then the Council can apply to their  employer for deductions to be made from their wages. The level of  deductions is set by statute15.  If a debtor is self employed, earns less than £75 per week or £300 per  month before tax, or lives on a pension or investment income then  deductions cannot be made.
Attachment of benefit
4.  One method of recovering council tax for local authorities is to apply  for a deduction from ongoing benefit to the Department for Work and  Pensions. However, this can only be done where a debtor is in receipt of  income support or (income based) Job Seekers Allowance. The level of  deductions is fixed by the Government at £2.90 per week, and so may not  be an effective method of clearing a large debt.
Committal hearing
5.  If the Council has attempted, but failed, to collect a debt through the  use of bailiffs then it can request that the debtor appear before the  Magistrates Court to consider if they should be committed to prison for  “wilful refusal” or “culpable neglect” in the non-payment of their  council tax. Magistrates must conduct a means enquiry to establish the  reason for non-payment. They are given options including committing the  debtor to prison, suspending any committal on terms (such as ordering a  fresh payment arrangement) or remitting some of the debt (i.e. writing  it off)16.
6.  If the debtor refuses to attend court, and the Council is not able to  have an arrest warrant executed then this recovery method is  ineffective.
Bankruptcy
7. Bankruptcy can be  used as a means to try and recover a debt where a creditor is owed at  least £750. With council tax debts, if a local authority chooses to use  bankruptcy as a means of recovery then it must first obtain a liability  order, for any sums it is owed.17  In addition, under the 1986 Insolvency Act rules that govern bankruptcy  proceedings the creditor must also serve a document known as a  statutory demand. This should explain the debt the Council is seeking to  recover.
8. A debtor can ask the County Court  to set aside a statutory demand on the basis that the debt is not owed.  One reason would be that the debtor was not capable of managing their  own affairs at the time of the bankruptcy order.
9.  If a statutory demand is served and the debt remains unpaid after a  further 21 days (or no arrangement has been made to the satisfaction of  the creditor), then a bankruptcy petition can be served. In effect, the  petition requests that the County Court (or High Court in London) make  an order that the debtor be declared bankrupt.
10.  Where a bankruptcy order is made, and a debtor has assets that might be  sold to settle a debt, a licensed insolvency practitioner will be  appointed as a trustee to safeguard and secure the assets of the debtor  for the benefit of creditors generally. Trustees are entitled to be paid  for the costs of their management of the estate of the bankrupt out of  the proceeds of the estate. Some fees are statutory18;  others are on a “time and costs” basis and will vary from case to case  and trustee to trustee, depending on what actions the Trustee has been  required to take.
11. In March 2000 the Court of Appeal held that  as bankruptcy was a procedure allowed by statute and regulations, there  could be no objection in principle to a Council using those proceedings  to collect an outstanding debt which it had a duty to collect.19
Charging Orders
12. Another method of collection available to a Council is to seek a charging order against a debtor.20  This is a way of securing a debt through the County Court against a  debtor’s property, so that in the event that the property is sold, the  creditor must be paid from the proceeds of sale. For a Council to be  able to pursue this course of action it must hold a liability order  against the debtor and the debtor must owe at least £1,000. The Courts  can consider suspending a Charging Order on repayment terms. Where a  creditor holds an outright Charging Order or any payment terms are not  adhered to, then the creditor can seek an Order for Sale. This too, can  be suspended at the Court’s discretion; for example on the basis of an  order that regular repayments are made.
13. The disadvantage of  Charging Orders is that the debt is not paid until the property is sold.  If there are current council tax debts these will need to be secured on  the property by a further Charging Order. If the debtor does not sell  the property themselves then the Council has to apply to the court for a  forced sale, incurring additional costs payable from the sale proceeds.  The court will decide if the sale will proceed; if the debt is small or  there are other family living in the property the court may refuse to  enforce the Order.
15 The Council Tax and Non-Domestic Rating (Amendment) (England) Regulations 2006
16 Council Tax (Administration and Enforcement) Regulations 1992, 47 & 48
17 Council Tax (Administration and Enforcement) Regulations 1992, 49(1)
18  The Official Receiver charges £1,715. The Department of Trade and  Industry charge are 17% of all realisations after the first £2,000.
19 Griffin v Wakefield Metropolitan District Council Court of Appeal (2000)
20 Council Tax (Administration and Enforcement) Regulations 1992, regulations 50 and 51
Appendix 2 – Schedule 3, Data Protection Act 1998
CONDITIONS RELEVANT FOR PURPOSES OF THE FIRST PRINCIPLE: PROCESSING OF SENSITIVE PERSONAL DATA
1. The data subject has given his explicit consent to the processing of the personal data.
2.  — (1) The processing is necessary for the purposes of exercising or  performing any right or obligation which is conferred or imposed by law  on the data controller in connection with employment.
(2) The Secretary of State may by order—
(a) exclude the application of sub-paragraph (1) in such cases as may be specified, or
(b) provide that, in such cases as may be specified, the condition in subparagraph
(1) is not to be regarded as satisfied unless such further conditions as may be specified in the order are also satisfied.
3. The processing is necessary—
(a) in order to protect the vital interests of the data subject or another person, in a case where—
(i) consent cannot be given by or on behalf of the data subject, or
(ii) the data controller cannot reasonably be expected to obtain the consent of the data subject, or
(b)  in order to protect the vital interests of another person, in a case  where consent by or on behalf of the data subject has been unreasonably  withheld.
4. The processing—
(a) is carried out in the course of its legitimate activities by any body or association which—
(i) is not established or conducted for profit, and
(ii) exists for political, philosophical, religious or trade-union purposes,
(b) is carried out with appropriate safeguards for the rights and freedoms of data subjects,
(c)  relates only to individuals who either are members of the body or  association or have regular contact with it in connection with its  purposes, and
(d) does not involve disclosure of the personal data to a third party without the consent of the data subject.
5.  The information contained in the personal data has been made public as a  result of steps deliberately taken by the data subject.
6. The processing—
(a) is necessary for the purpose of, or in connection with, any legal proceedings (including prospective legal proceedings),
(b) is necessary for the purpose of obtaining legal advice, or
(c) is otherwise necessary for the purposes of establishing, exercising or defending legal rights.
7. — (1) The processing is necessary—
(a) for the administration of justice,
(aa) for the exercise of any functions of either House of Parliament,
(b )for the exercise of any functions conferred on any person by or under an enactment, or
(c) for the exercise of any functions of the Crown, a Minister of the Crown or a government department.
(2) The Secretary of State may by order—
(a) exclude the application of sub-paragraph (1) in such cases as may be specified, or
(b) provide that, in such cases as may be specified, the condition in subparagraph
(1) is not to be regarded as satisfied unless such further conditions as may be specified in the order are also satisfied.
8. — (1) The processing is necessary for medical purposes and is undertaken by—
(a) a health professional, or
(b)  a person who in the circumstances owes a duty of confidentiality which  is equivalent to that which would arise if that person were a health  professional.
(2) In this paragraph “medical purposes” includes the  purposes of preventative medicine, medical diagnosis, medical research,  the provision of care and treatment and the management of healthcare  services.
9. — (1) The processing—
(a) is of sensitive personal data consisting of information as to racial or ethnic origin,
(b)  is necessary for the purpose of identifying or keeping under review the  existence or absence of equality of opportunity or treatment between  persons of different racial or ethnic origins, with a view to enabling  such equality to be promoted or maintained, and
(c) is carried out with appropriate safeguards for the rights and freedoms of data subjects.
(2)  The Secretary of State may by order specify circumstances in which  processing falling within sub-paragraph (1)(a) and (b) is, or is not, to  be taken for the purposes of sub-paragraph (1)(c) to be carried out  with appropriate safeguards for the rights and freedoms of data  subjects.
10. The personal data are processed in  circumstances specified in an order made by the Secretary of State for  the purposes of this paragraph.